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Abstract
The need for lightweight cryptography for resource-constrained devices gained a great
importance due to the rapid evolution and usage of IoT devices in the world. Although it
has been common in the cryptology community that stream ciphers are more eﬃcient in
speed and area than symmetric block ciphers, it has been seen in the last 10-15 years that
most of ciphers designed for resource-constrained devices to take up less area and less
energy on hardware-based platforms, such as ASIC or FPGA, are lightweight symmetric
block ciphers.
On the other hand, the design and analysis of stream ciphers using keyed internal update
function is put forward against this belief and it has become one of the popular study
subjects in the literature in the last few years. Plantlet, proposed in 2017, its predecessor
Sprout, proposed in 2015 and Fruit proposed in 2016, are famous algorithms as instances
of stream ciphers using keyed internal update function. Sprout was broken after a short
time by many researchers but Plantlet hasn't been successfully broken yet and there has
been only one attack mounted on Fruit since it was proposed.
Traditionally, key stream generators of stream ciphers update their internal states only
by using their current internal state. Since the use of the key in the internal update is
a new approach, the security analysis of this approach is not fully understood. In this
study, the security analysis of the key stream generators with keyed update function has
been studied. A new attack algorithm for internal state recovery and key recovery has
been developed and mounted on Plantlet algorithm as an instance of stream ciphers with
keyed update function. The state bits and key bits are successfully recovered. In the
second phase, the attack algorithm was mounted on Fruit algorithm and state bits and
key bits are also recovered successfully.
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Dizi ifreleme Algoritmalar için Parametrik Tahmin Et ve Belirle
Saldrs
Ebru Küçükkuba³
Öz
Dünyadaki IoT cihazlarnn hzl evrimi ve kullanm nedeniyle, kaynak kstl cihazlar için
haﬁf sklet kriptograﬁ ihtiyac büyük önem kazanm³tr. Dizi ³ifreleme algoritmalarnn,
özellikle belli platformlarda daha hzl çal³malar ve ya daha az yer kaplamalar açsn-
dan blok ³ifreleme algoritmalarna nazaran daha verimli oldu§u konusunda kriptoloji
camiasnda olu³mu³ ortak bir kan olsa da son 10-15 ylda tasarlanm³ blok ³ifreleme
algoritmalar bu kany ykacak niteliktedir. Özellikle ASIC ya da FPGA gibi donanm
tabanl platformlarda az yer kaplayacak ya da az enerji harcayacak ³ekilde tasarlan-
m³ simetrik ³ifreleme algoritmalarnn birço§unun blok ³ifreleme algoritmalar oldu§u
görülmektedir.
Di§er taraftan bu kanya aykr olacak ³ekilde ortaya atlan anahtarl içsel durum gün-
celleme tekni§iyle kayan anahtar üreci kullanan dizi ³ifreleme algoritmalarnn tasarm
ve analizi literatürde son birkaç yl içinde popüler çal³ma konularndan birisi olmu³tur.
2015'te yaynlanan Sprout algoritmas ve 2017'de yaynlanan Sprout'un üst versiyonu
olarak tasarlanm³ Plantlet algoritmas ve ve 2016 ylnda yaynlanan Fruit algoritmas
anahtarl içsel durum güncellemesi yapan dizi ³ifreleme algoritmalarnn ünlü örnekleridir.
Sprout yaynladktan ksa bir süre sonra birçok ara³trmac tarafndan farkl kriptoanaliz
metodlaryla krlm³tr ancak Plantlet algoritmas henüz ba³arl olarak krlamam³tr.
Fruit algoritmasna da yaynlad§ndan beri bir adet atak yaplm³tr.
Genellike dizi ³ifreleme algoritmalarnn kayan anahtar üreteçleri içsel durumlarn sadece
mevcut içsel durumlarn kullanarak güncellemektedir. Anahtar kullanm ile içsel durum
güncelleme yeni bir yakla³m olmas nedeniyle, bu yakla³mn güvenlik analizleri tam
olarak olgunla³mam³tr.
Bu tezde anahtar kullanm ile içsel durum güncellemesi yapan kayan anahtar üreteç-
lerinin güvenlik analizi çal³lm³tr. Yaplan analizin literatürdeki belirli algoritmalara
uygulanmas çal³malar yaplm³tr. Bu kapsamda içsel durum ve anahtar elde etme için
genel bir atak algoritmas geli³tirilmi³ ve bu atak algoritmas örnek olarak Planlet ve
Fruit algoritmalarna uygulanm³, içsel durum ve anahtar bitleri elde edilmi³tir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Dizi ifreleme, Grain Ailesi, Sprout, Plantlet Algoritmas, Fruit
Algoritmas
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As the use of the IoT devices like RFID tags, wireless sensors becomes more and more
pervasive and ubiqutious, the need for exchange of conﬁdential and sensitive data through
unsecure channels such as the Internet by these resource-constrained devices and systems
increases and these sensitive data become susceptible to various attacks. Since these de-
vices are resource-constrained, conventional cryptographic algorithms are not convenient
for these devices. Lightweight cryptography aims to provide algorithms for resource-
constrained devices having restricted hardware environments where the power or energy
consumption, gate count and the memory is limited.
Many ultra lightweight block ciphers have been developed in the last 10 decade like
Midori [1], KTANTAN [2], PRESENT [3], LED [4], SIMON/SPECK [5], Simeck [6] and
Piccolo [7] but ultra lightweight stream ciphers are not so easily designed because of the
design principle that to achieve a K-bit security, internal state size of the cipher must
be at least 2K bits.
At FSE (Fast Software Encrytion) 2015, Armknecht and Mikhalev proposed a new stream
cipher, Sprout [8] with a novel idea for keystream generators having internal state size
shorter than 2K by using a ﬁxed key in the internal state update function. They deﬁned it
as keystream generator with keyed update function. Sprout was broken after a short time
by many researchers [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], so the designers of Sprout developed another
algorithm, Plantlet [14] by ﬁxing the bugs and the weaknesses of Sprout. Plantlet has
been in the literature for about 2 years and there has been no successful attack proposed
for Plantlet yet. Another algorithm Fruit [15] having keyed update function like Sprout
1
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and Plantlet was proposed in 2016 and there has been only one attack on Fruit since it
was proposed.
One of the attacks mounted on Sprout is internal state recovery attack by Kara and Esgin
[9]. Sprout's main weakness lies on its round key function. The key bits are not always
used in the internal state update function where feedback values can be determined or
guessed without knowing the key bits for some of the internal states. Just after their
attack on Sprout, they generalized the attack idea and introduced a new algorithm that
can be successfully mounted on any keystream generator with keyed update function
where the key bits are incorporated into the states during state update in a biased
manner [11]. It may still be possible to guess the feedback value without knowing the
key with an overwhelming probability.
They deﬁne the notion of "guess capacity" as the probability of guessing the feedback
value correctly for a given internal state without knowing the key. Their generic attack
is successful if the guess capacity is strictly higher than one-half. The guess capacity of
Sprout is much higher than one-half because of the weak structure of round key function;
incorporating the key bits into the feedback function.
After introducing the notion of guess capacity of the feedback function of a keystream
generator with keyed update function, it was immediately adopted as a security criterion.
Indeed, the ﬁxed version of Sprout, Plantlet has the guess capacity of one-half. Similarly,
the guess capacity of Fruit is ﬁxed to one-half in its ultimate version. As a conclusion,
the Kara and Esgin attack is applicable to neither Plantlet nor Fruit. In fact, there are
no successful attacks so far on any of the both ciphers. Hence, the security analysis of the
keystream generators with keyed update function having the guess capacities of one-half
is an open problem in such stream cipher designs.
In this study, we proposed a new generic internal state and key recovery attack for
stream ciphers with keyed update function having guess capacity one-half and applied
it on Plantlet and Fruit. We used the attack developed by Kara and Esgin [11] as the
starting point. Their attack was applied to Sprout but could not be applied to Plantlet
because of the round key function of Plantlet. We developed a new attack using the
weakness of involving the key bit directly into the internal state update function. By
this new attack, we recovered key bits and internal state bits at the same time. Since
the internal state size of Plantlet is greater than key size, the attack complexity is bigger
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than exhaustive key search. To decrease the complexity of the attack, we made two
extensions. First, we modiﬁed the new attack by using variables for some taps of the
LFSR and also added another phase by solving nonlinear equations during key recovery.
As a proof of concept, we tested the idea of decreasing complexity practically with six
variables and successfully implemented the attack and recovered internal state and key
bits. This test decreased the attack complexity but it is still slower than exhaustive key
search. The attack complexity should be decreased using more variables but this would
need precomputation and memory to generate and solve nonlinear equations eﬃciently.
As a second extension to decrease the attack complexity, we combined our attack with
trade-oﬀ attacks and made a generalization for the internal state size for Plantlet like
ciphers to be resistant to TMDTO attacks.
In the second phase of our study, we mounted our generic attack on Fruit algorithm
which has guess-capacity one-half like Plantlet. The state and key bits are also recovered
successfully. Unlike Plantlet, Fruit was that it has internal state size equal to key size,
80 bits. Our attack is faster than the exhaustive key search even without using variables
since initialization phase is not considered and implemented during attack which should
be taken into consideration for exhaustive key search attack.
1.1 Related Work
Since the notion of stream ciphers with keyed update function is a new topic in lightweight
cryptography, the research on stream ciphers with keyed update function are made in
the last few years. [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [16] are some examples of them.
Kara and Esgin introduced a guess and determine attack combined with a divide and
conquer attack on full Sprout [9]. Lallemand and Plasencia proposed a divide-and-
conquer attack for recovering the key bits of Sprout [10]. Kara and Esgin introduced
generalized divide and conquer attack on stream ciphers with keyed update function.
It is an internal state recovery attack and can be mounted if guess capacity of the
cipher is greater than one-half [11]. Zhang and Gong introduced TMD tradeoﬀ attack
developed by for stream ciphers having shorter internal states [12]. Dey and Santanu
Sarkar proposed a divide and conquer attack for cryptanalysis of full round Fruit using
the weakness in round key generation [16].
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1.2 Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is the introducing a novel and generic internal state
and key recovery attack for stream ciphers with keyed update function having guess
capacity one-half. This was an open question for the security of stream ciphers having
keystream generators with keyed update function.
Stream ciphers with keyed update function was born four years ago with an algorithm,
Sprout [8] proposed in FSE 2015. This algorithm with the keyed update function design
has attracted the attention of many researchers since using the key in the update function
of internal state enables using shorter internal state size which is critical in lightweight
cryptography. Sprout was broken practically after a short time [9], [11] and then the
designers of Sprout ﬁxed the bugs in Sprout and proposed another algorithm, Plantlet
[14], two years later. Planlet hasn't been broken yet successfully. The attacks mounted
on Sprout couldn't be applied to Plantlet. Another algorithm Fruit [15] having keyed
update function was proposed in 2016. The algorithm has internal state size like in
Sprout but the authors claimed that their design rationale doesn't have the weaknesses
of Sprout and there has been only one attack against [16] Fruit since it was published.
As one of the rule of thumb of a keystream generator with keyed update function, its
guess capacity should be one-half in order not to be exploited by the Kara and Esgin
attack [11]. We see that the ultimate versions of such designs are in compliance with
this security criterion. Indeed, both Plantlet and the latest version of Fruit have guess
capacities exactly one-half. There are no successfull attacks mounted on them yet using
guess capacity, thanks to the new criterion.
In this thesis, we study the security of Plantlet and Fruit like ciphers. We introduce the
question whether divide and conquer type attacks can be mountable on ciphers with the
guess capacities of one-half to recover their keys or to distinguish the correct internal
state among arbitrary states.
We proposed a new generic attack and mounted it on Plantlet and Fruit. This attack can
be applied to any stream cipher with keyed update function having guess capacity one-
half. Guess capacity is the probability of guessing the feedback value of the internal state
without knowing the key. Since the key bit is directly involved in the update function of
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Plantlet and Fruit, the probability of guessing the feedback value of the internal state is
one-half.
Our generic attack uses the weakness of involving key bits directly and cyclically in
the update function of keystream generator. The attacker has an output stream and
his aim is to recover the internal state bits which generated this output stream among
arbitrary internal state candidates and recover key bits used during this generation.
Using algorithm output function, feedback values of the keystream generator is either
determined from output stream or guessed. In Plantlet, keystream generation is run
and formulated in backward direction and feedback values are directly determined from
output stream values. In Fruit, no need to formulate in backward direction since the
feedback values can be directly determined from output stream. After determining the
feedback values for each internal state candidate, the key bits are determined using the
update function of the keystream generator for each internal state candidate. Since the
key bits are used cyclically, after cycle period, key bits determined should be equal to
each other as kt = kt−period for the correct internal state. Using these equalities, wrong
internal state candidates are eliminated and correct internal state key bits conform this
equality. Correct internal state is recovered and at the same time key bits are also
determined at the end of the attack.
For internal state recovery, the attack complexity is 2internalstatesize. The attack algo-
rithm should use all possible internal states to recover the correct internal state. If the
internal state size is greater than key size like in Plantlet, the attack is not eﬃcient since
exhaustive key search would be preferable. We reduced the attack complexity with two
novel ideas. The ﬁrst one is using variables for some bits of the internal state. Since
in keystream generators, internal state update and output functions are simple XOR
and multiplication functions of internal state bits, using variables for some bits of inter-
nal state and running and parameterizing our generic algorithm using these variables is
successful in reducing complexity. At the end of the attack, the key bits are nonlinear
equations of the variables. These equations are solved for the variables and a unique
solution is achieved for the correct internal state and other internal states are elimi-
nated. After solving equations and recovering the correct internal state, the key bits
are determined using the solved equations. The second idea to reduce attack complexity
is to combine our algorithm with trade-oﬀ attack. Given an output stream sequence,
the attacker makes a guess for internal state and using our attack, he can determine
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key bits and the following output stream sequence. This can be formulized as a one-
way function of internal state bits and output stream sequences. Using Hellman tables
with our attack, instead of searching all 2internalstatesize, attack complexity is reduced to
280 time complexity, 261 memory complexity and 280 data complexity where the data
complexity can be decreased by increasing the memory complexity. This would be the
trade-oﬀ for the attacker. Using this trade-oﬀ, a generalization is made for Plantlet like
ciphers where guess capacity is one-half and key cycle is equal to number of key bits as
T (DM)2 = (NK)2. By using this formula, two corollaries are achieved. The ﬁrst one is
that for Plantlet like ciphers, the internal state size must be at least keysize∗(3/2) to be
resistant to TMDTO attacks. The second one is that using our new guess and determine
attack with trade-oﬀ attack, the attack complexity for Planlet is reduced to 272.4.
The contributions of the thesis are summarized as:
• Guessing and determining the feedback values and key bits of the keystream ge-
nerators having guess capacity one-half.
• Designing a new guess and determine attack for internal state recovery and key
recovery at the same time.
• Keystream generation in backward direction to simplify the attack.
• Using variables for internal state bits in order to decrease the complexity of the
attack.
• Combining the attack with trade-oﬀ attacks to decrease complexity.
• Making a generalization for the internal state size of Plantlet like ciphers to be
resistant to TMDTO attacks.
1.3 Outline
This thesis is organized into six chapters.
The ﬁrst two chapters contain introductory information about the subject of the thesis.
The third chapter contains related information about the generic attack introduced in
the thesis. The fourth chapter gives speciﬁcations and the security of the algorithms we
Chapter 1. Introduction 7
studied for our attack. The ﬁfth chapter give the new information about the details of
the generic attack developed and the sixth chapter gives a brief conclusion of the study.
Some ﬁgures are used from literature in the thesis. Their sources are cited in the caption
of the ﬁgures.
The summary of chapters are:
Chapter 1 provides brief introduction to the stream ciphers with keyed update function,
the generic attack mounted on Sprout and the new successor attack mounted on Plantlet
and Fruit.
Chapter 2 gives an introduction on cryptology, symmetric ciphers, stream ciphers, types
and basic cryptological concepts of stream ciphers, attacks and make an introduction to
lightweight stream ciphers with Grain family. Design criteria of Grain family is discussed.
Chapter 3 is dedicated on Sprout algorithm and guess and determine attack applied to
Sprout which is the starting point of parametric guess and determine attack.
Chapter 4 is focused on Planlet algorithm and Fruit algorithm speciﬁcations.
Chapter 5 is focused on the new guess and qetermine attack and parametric guess
and determine attack mounted on Plantlet and Fruit algorithms. An extension made to
improved guess and determine attack for Plantlet like ciphers is also given.
Chapter 6 gives a brief conclusion of the thesis.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Stream Ciphers
Cryptography is the science of using mathematics for data security. By cryptography,
data is stored or transmitted across insecure networks so that only receiver can read it.
While cryptography's aim is the data security, cryptanalysis is used to analyze and break
secure communications of data. Application of mathematical tools, analytical reasoning,
pattern ﬁnding, determination and patience are basic items of cryptanalysis. Cryptology
comprises both cryptography and cryptanalysis.
The most common service of cryptology is conﬁdentiality (by encryption) but it is also
used for authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, anonimity, availability, privacy, etc..
Conﬁdentiality is provided by encryption algorithms; ciphers. Ciphers are classiﬁed as
symmetric and asymmetric ciphers. In symmetric ciphers, same key is used in encryption
and decryption. Symmetric key ciphers are also classifed as block ciphers and stream
ciphers.
Stream cipher is a symmetric key cipher where a pseudorandom cipher digit stream,
called keystream is combined with plaintext digits. The basic structure of encryption and
decrytion of stream ciphers is shown in Figure 2.1 . A secret key and a public initialization
vector is shared between two parties. After an initialization stage, keystream is generated
by a keystream generator and plaintext digits are XOR'ed with generated keystream
forming ciphertext digits. At the receiver side same scenario is applied. The keystream
bits generated by the same key stream generator are XOR'ed with the ciphertext digits
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forming the plaintext digits. Use of IV is necessary, otherwise the same stream will be
produced each time unless the key is not changed.
Figure 2.1: Stream Ciphers [17]
2.1.1 Types Of Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are classiﬁed as synchronous and asynchronous(self-synchronizing) with
respect to the key stream generation.
Synchronous Stream Ciphers
In synchronous stream ciphers, the plaintext message and the ciphertext have no eﬀect on
keystream generation. Basic structure is shown in Figure 2.2. Changing a bit in cipher-
text during transmission only aﬀects corresponding plaintext on receiver side. There
is no error propagation but inserting/deleting a bit in ciphertext during transmission
aﬀects the rest of the plaintext on the receiver side and synchronization is lost.
Asynchronous (self-synchronizing) Stream Ciphers
In asynchronous stream ciphers, the key and a ﬁxed number of previous ciphertext digits
are used in keystream generation. Basic structure is shown in Figure 2.3. Changing a
bit in ciphertext during transmission aﬀects some number of plaintext on receiver side.
Figure 2.2: Synchronous Stream Ciphers [18]
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Figure 2.3: Self-synchronizing Stream Ciphers [19]
There is small error propagation. Inserting/deleting a bit in ciphertext will be recovered
after some bits on the receiver side which implies self-synchronization.
2.1.2 Keystream Generator Internal Structure
Keystream generation is the focus of the stream ciphers. Designing a stream cipher con-
sists of designing the keystream generator mainly. The formal deﬁnition of a keystream
generator(KSG) is given below: A KSG is executed on three space sets;
• the key space K = GF (2)k
• the IV space IV = GF (2)v
• the state space S = GF (2)s
and consists of three functions
• an initialization function, Init : IV xK → S
• an update function, Upd : S → S
• an output function, Out : S → GF (2)
A keystream generator operates in two phases:
• An IV and a secret key are used as inputs and the internal state is set to an initial
state in the initialization phase, st0 := Init(iv, k)
• Then, the following operations are executed repeatedly in the keystream generation
phase:
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 Generate the next keystream bit zt = Out(stt)
 Update the internal state stt to stt+1 := Upd(stt)
Keystream generation does not directly involve key anymore in the conventional scenario.
In stream ciphers, since encryption or decryption is just an XOR operation, an adversary
can easily recover the keystream for the known plaintext scenario. For a stream cipher
to be secure:
• Adversary can not generate the keystream in forward or backward direction or can
not recover the key, if she knows some part of the keystream.
• Adversary can not recover any internal state of the cipher at time t where t > 0. If
adversory recovers the state, he can generate the keystream in forward or backward
direction.
The basic expectation for a generated keystream is that using a polynomial time algo-
rithm, the keystream must be indistinguishable from a truly random sequence . This is
achieved by cryptographically secure pseudo random number generators (PRNG). Cryp-
tographically secure PRNGs are generally implemented in two ways:
• Using block ciphers in CFB, CTR, OFB mode
• Using shift registers with feedback.
2.1.3 Shift Register Based Stream Ciphers
In stream ciphers, traditionally one or multiple linear feedback shift registers(LFRS) are
used. An LFSR is shift register having a linear feedback function. An example LFSR is
shown in Fig 2.4.
LFSRs are constructed by clocked storage elements (ﬂip-ﬂops) and a feedback path. Flip-
ﬂop count determines the degree of an LFSR. The input for the last ﬂip-ﬂop is computed
by the feedback network. It is the XOR-sum of some certain ﬂip-ﬂops in the shift register
which is called the feedback function.
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Figure 2.4: LFSR [20]
The maximum sequence length produced by an LFSR of degree m is 2m -1 because all-
zero state is excluded. Feedback function can be represented by a polynomial and for a
maximum sequence, polynomial must be primitive. Feedback functions should be chosen
to create maximum sequence length.
Although the sequence generated by an LFSR has good statistical properties, it is un-
fortunately cryptographically weak because of linearity. If an attacker knows 2m output
bits of an LFSR of size m, she can exactly construct the LFSR by solving a system of
linear equations. It is assumed that feedback coeﬃcients of LFSR are also not known.
If feedback coeﬃcients are known, m output bits are enough. Since using an LFSR is
not a secure solution for keystream generation design in stream cipher, cipher designers
used the following solutions:
1. Multiple LFSR with irregular clocking
2. Combination with nonlinear feedback shift register(NFSR) (A NFSR has a nonlin-
ear feedback function)
3. Nonlinear output function
GSM A5/1 is an example of LFSR based stream ciphers. Its multiple LFSR with irregular
clocking structure is shown in Fig 2.5. Key Generation is done with XORing of 3 LFSR
outputs but at each clock three LFSRs are not clocked. Some LFSR bits are used to
decide which LFSR to clock.Probability of one LFSR to clock is 6/8.
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Figure 2.5: GSM A5/1 Structure [21]
2.1.4 Stream Cipher Attack Models
Attacker Goals
For stream cipher cryptanalysis, attacker aim is to generate the keystream. This can be
done in three ways.
1. The attacker tries to recover key. This is a standard attack for all ciphers like in
symmetric block ciphers.
2. The attacker tries to recover a state value at any time t>0in order to generate
the keystream in forward or backward direction. With an invertible initialisation
function, she can also recover the key.
3. The attacker tries to ﬁnd a distinguisher and predicts next-bit value.
Attacker Access
For stream cipher cryptanalysis, attacker can have access to ciphertexts,or chooses plain-
texts and receives corresponding ciphertexts or chooses IVs and receives the correspond-
ing ciphertexts.
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2.1.5 Basic Attacks To Stream Ciphers
Using the attack models above, basic attacks [22], [23], [24], [25], [26] againts stream
ciphers are listed below:
• Correlation Attack: The attacker tries to ﬁnd a statistical dependence between the
keystream and the output of one of LFSRs/a linear combination of few inputs and
tries to ﬁnd the initial state of this LFSR independently of the other LFSRs.
• Distinguishing Attack: The attacker's aim is to ﬁnd a distinguisher for the gener-
ated keystream from a truly random sequence and identiﬁes the relations between
internal state variables and output keystream.
• Fault Attack:
1. A fault is injected and the keystream is produced.
2. A guess is made for the eﬀect of the fault.
3. Guess is checked whether the guess is correct, otherwise a new guess is made.
4. Steps 1-3 are repeated many times
5. Linear equations are solved to ﬁnd the initial state of the LFSR.
• Guess-and-Determine Attack: A part of the internal state is guessed and the re-
maining state elements and running key sequence is determined. The resulting key
sequence is compared with the real key sequence.
• Time-Memory Trade-oﬀ Attack: The attack has two phases. The general structure
of the algorithm is explored and ﬁndings are summarized in large tables in the
preprocessing phase. In real time phase, using the real data generated from a
particular unknown key, the precomputed tables are used to ﬁnd the unknown key.
• Chosen-IV Attack: The attacker chooses IVs many times and combines the relations
of resulting keystream and state bits. He then derives simple relations between the
state bits and secret key bits.
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2.2 Grain Family
2.2.1 History of Grain Family
Lightweight cryptography algorithms should be either very fast in software or should be
very small in hardware to be preferrable against block ciphers in OFB or CTR mode.
This idea has been reﬂected by the eSTREAM Project [27], which was launched in 2004
as part of ECRYPT, the European Network of Excellence in Cryptology. The aim of
eSTREAM was to promote the design of new stream ciphers that would be either very
fast in software or very resource-eﬃcient in hardware.
A new stream cipher Grain[28] was developed by Hell, Johansson and Meier for e-
STREAM Project and Grain v1[28] was one of the seven ﬁnal ciphers of the eSTREAM
portfolio for the hardware-oriented part in 2008. Since Grain v1 has 80 bit key length,
the designers developed Grain128 [29] and Grain128a [30] for the 128 bit key security.
2.2.2 Grain Family Structure
The Grain family algorithm structure is shown in Figure 2.6. The Grain family algorithm
is a synchronous stream cipher. Its design is based on two shift registers, an LFSR and
an NFSR and an output function. Both NFSR and LFSR sizes are 80/128 bits. The key
size is 80/128 bits and the IV size is 64/96 bits.
Grain128 design speciﬁcation is given as an example of Grain family. The notation of
the LFSR is shown as si, si+1, ..., si+ 128 and the NFSR is shown as bi, bi+1, ..., bi+128.
The LFSR update function is deﬁned as:
si+128 = si + si+7 + si+38 + si+70 + si+81 + si+96.
The NFSR update function is deﬁned as:
bi+128 = si + bi + bi+26 + bi+56 + bi+91 + bi+96 + bi+3bi+67 + bi+11bi+13 + bi+17bi+18 +
bi+27bi+59 + bi+40bi+48 + bi+61bi+65 + bi+68bi+84
An h(x) function is deﬁned as:
h(x) = bi+12si+8 + si+13si+20 + bi+95si+42 + si+60si+79 + bi+12bi+95si+95
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Figure 2.6: Grain Family Structure [31]
The output function is deﬁned as zi =
∑
j∈A bi+j + h(x) + si+93 where
A = 2, 15, 36, 45, 64, 73, 89
Cipher Initialization
The cipher is initialized with the key and the IV before the generation of the keystream.
Grain-128 key and IV initalization structure is shown in Figure 2.7
Figure 2.7: Grain Key and IV Initalization [29]
The steps followed in initalization are:
• All 128 bits of NFSR are ﬁlled with the key bits.
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• The 96 bit IV is loaded to the ﬁrst 96 bits of LFSR. The remaining 32 bits of LFSR
are loaded by ones. In Grain 128a last bit is set to zero.
• Without producing any keystream, the cipher is clocked 2K(number of key bits)
times.
• The output function is fed back and combined (XORed) with the inputs of the
LFSR and the NFSR.
2.2.3 Grain Family Design Criteria/Choices
In this section, reasons and usage of the NFSR, LFSR and output functions will be given
against cryptanalytic attacks.
Usage of NFSR
An NFSR is used since using an LFSR without an NFSR would be vulnerable to alge-
braic attacks. Nonlinear update of the NFSR makes it impossible to solve equations for
160/256 bit state
Size of LFSR and NFSR
Internal state size must be at least twice of key size, so the state size is chosen as 160/256
bit (state size of LFSR + state size of NFSR). Computational complexity will be 280 or
2128 for TMDTO attacks.
Choice of f()
Feedback polynomial of LFSR is primitive polynomial assuring a period at least 280 − 1
or 2128 − 1. Number of taps entering the polynomial should be greater than ﬁve for
correlation attacks. Big number of taps is not preferrable for hardware implementation.
In Grain family LFSR feedback polynomials have 6 taps.
Choice of g()
Feedback function of NFSR, g() is used to achieve high nonlinearity. NFSR is masked
with output of LFSR and add linear terms for balancedness against linear approximation
attacks.
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Choice of Output Function
Output function depend on both registers. h(x) is a nonlinear and balanced function.
Output function uses this non linearity and linear terms added to prevent unbalancedness
for linear approximation attacks.
Initialization Choice
Contents of shift registers are scrambled by the initialization phase before the keystream
generation. The number of clockings for initialiation phase is a tradeoﬀ between speed
and security. The number of clocking of the initialization phase will be criticalif the
cipher is initialized often with a new IV. The LFSR is ﬁlled with the IV and ones at
the beginning. The initialization with two diﬀerent IVs, diﬀering by only one bit, should
end with shift register bits are the same for both initializations should be close to 0.5.
160/256 clockings provides this probability.
Throughput Rate
At regular clocking the output rate is 1 bit/clock in Grain128 design but it is possible to
increase the speed of cipher with using more hardware since last 31 bits of shift registers
are not used in update and output function. Using this, speed can be multiplied by 32.
The output rate can be 32 bits/clock.If speed is multiplied by 32 , shift registers should
be designed to be shifted by 32.
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Sprout
In this chapter, Sprout algorithm and the generic guess and determine attack which is
the starting point of our proposed attack, mounted on Sprout is explained in detail.
3.1 Sprout
A new algorithm named as Sprout using the basic design of Grain family was developed
at 2015 by Armknecht and Mikhalev [8]. The aim was to achieve a resistancy to TMDTO
attacks for stream ciphers even using shorter internal states.
TMDTO attacks against keystream generators can be done in two ways:
• Recover key: It is like exhaustive key search but it is precomputed. Search space
is 2k.
• Recover the internal state: The attacker takes an internal state and generates
output stream and saves the result. Search space is 2s. To achieve a k bit security,
the internal state size should be greater than k since knowing one internal state
provides computing all succeeding and preceeding keystreams, there is no need to
search all 2s space. It is calculated as the internal state size should be greater than
2k.
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Chapter 3. Sprout 20
3.1.1 Keystream-equivalent states
Two states, st and st' are called as keystream-equivalent states if there exists an integer
m such that after we update st by Upd() function m times, we get the same keystream
for both st and st'. The structure of key stream equivalent states is shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Key Stream Equivalent States [32]
Using key equivalent states, state space S is composed of L diﬀerent equivalence classes.
A TMDTO attack will be the combination of TMDTO attacks, each of them will be for
each equivalence class. So aim is to design a cipher where L> 2k.
In order to decrease the state size of the cipher, the designers of Sprout developed a
strategy for key stream equivalent states. The design was adding a distinct ﬁxed part to
state. State will have a ﬁxed and a variable part.Since ﬁxed part can not be changed,
two diﬀerent values of ﬁxed part result in two diﬀerent equivalent classes. A KSG with
ﬁxed internal state parts is shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Keystream Generator with Fixed Internal State Parts [32]
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3.1.2 Keystream Generator With Keyed Update Function
The designers of Sprout developed a novel keystream generator using the ﬁxed part idea
in the state of the stream cipher. They deﬁned it as "Keystream generator with keyed
update function".
Figure 3.3: Keystream Generator With Keyed Update Function [32]
A keystream generator with keyed update function (KSGUF) works on three spaces
• the key space K = GF (2)k
• the IV space IV = GF (2)v
• the state space S = GF (2)s
and has three functions
• an initialization function Init : IV xK− > S
• a bijective update function Upd : KxS− > S
• an output function Out : S− > GF (2)
A variable st and a ﬁxed k composes the internal state. The ﬁxed secret key is involved
in the state update. Simplifed structure of a KSG is shown in Figure 3.3.
The advantage of using a ﬁxed key is that the cipher would have at least 2k diﬀerent
key-stream equivalence since (st,k) and (st',k') when k is not equal to k' will not generate
the same keystream so it is possible to use shorter internal state and save area size. Using
a ﬁxed value is preferred because it uses less area than using a variable value.
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3.1.3 Sprout Structure
Sprout has an NFSR, an LFSR and an output function which have similar structure like
Grain family.
Figure 3.4: Sprout [8]
There are three basic diﬀerences between Grain family and Sprout.
1. Round Key Bits: A round key function is added in Sprout. At each clock cycle, the
next key bit is selected cyclically and added to NFSR if the sum of some certain
LFSR and NFSR bits are equal to 1. Sprout design is shown in Figure 3.4.
2. Counter: Counter is used in initialization like in Grain. Selection of the current
round key bit is done by the part of the counter. Since shifted keys can generate
shifted keystreams, one of the counter bits is used in the update function of NFSR.
3. Register Lengths: Size of FSRs reduced to 40 bits, IV size 70 bits
The details of Sprout speciﬁcation are:
• LFSR uses primitive polynomial having a period of 240-1.
• NFSR feedback function g(x) is like in Grain128a with diﬀerent indexes.
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• 9 bit counter splits into 2 parts. 7 bits for index of key bit. 2 bits for initialization
phase to count until 4x80 = 320
• Round Key Function is:
The content of the LFSR : li, li+1, ..., li+39
The content of the NFSR : ni, ni+1, ..., ni+39
Key : k0, k1, ..., k79
k∗t : the round key bit produced at the clock-cycle t
k∗t = kt, 0 ≤ t ≤ 79
k∗t = (ktmod80) ∗ (l4 + l21 + l37 + n9 + n20 + n29), t ≥ 80
The circuit design of round key function is shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Round Key Function [32]
• Output function is a nonlinear function of the LFSR and the NFSR bits.
• Initialization Phase: Since the IV is 70 bits, the 40 bit NFSR is loaded with ﬁrst
40 bits of IV and the 30 bit LFSR is loaded with last 30 bits of IV. Remaining 9 bit
of LFSR is loaded with 1 and last bit of LFSR, l39 is loaded with 0. Algorithm is
clocked 320 times. During this stage, the keystream is not generated. The output
function is fed back into the inputs of LFSR and NFSR.
The Initialization Phase of Sprout is shown in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Initialization Phase of Sprout [32]
3.1.4 Guess-and-Determine Attacks Against Sprout
Cryptanalysis of Sprout was done by many researchers and many attacks were done and
published [9], [10], [12], [13] in a very short time. One of them was guess and determine
attack combined with a divide and conquer attack developed by Kara and Esgin [9]. It
was an internal state recovery attack. Later they generalized their attack in [11].
It was a generic attack not only for Sprout. They made a new deﬁnition as keystream
generators with Boolean Keyed Feedback Function (KSGs with Boolean KFF) where
the key-dependent part of the Keyed Update Function (KUF) is a Boolean function and
only one bit of the output of KUF depends on the key. They didn't focus on output and
feedback functions, internal state size or bits of NFSR and LFSR used in the update
functions of Sprout. Their attack can be mounted on any KSGs with Boolean KFF with
a limitation that the cipher should have the average guess capacity higher than one-half.
They applied the generic attack on Sprout as an instance for KSG with Boolean KFF.
They deﬁned guess capacity as guessing a feedback value of an internal state alone
without knowing the key. Formally, the average guess capacity is the average probability
of guessing a feedback value correctly for an arbitrary internal state without knowing the
key. If this guess capacity is higher than one-half, it means that it would be possible to
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suggest a feedback value and check whether this guess is correct or not using the output
stream.
In the attack, the attacker has a keystream and she tries to ﬁnd the internal state which
produced this keystream in a set of candidate states. The attacker predicts feedback
values of candidate states and and also checks whether the feedback value can be deter-
mined from the keystream. They used the guess capacity of the state to check whether
the feedback value is the expected one or not. They deﬁned the mismatch as the un-
expected value for the feedback value. The number of mismatches for a correct state
would be much less than the number of mismatches for the wrong states but for a wrong
state, the number of mismatches is expected to be half of the total number of iterations.
The attacker goes on recovering the next feedback value for each candidate state and
also keeps the counts of mismatched feedback values for each candidate. The recovering
feedback value and counting procedure continues for each state candidate until the state
is eliminated because of exceeding the threshold value for mismatch count.
The mismatch count for a wrong state is approximately one half of the iteration where
mismatch count for the correct state is (1- guesscapacity) times number of iterations.
Hence, the attack can be applied to keystream generators with KFF having guess capaci-
ties greater than one half. If guess capacity is one-half , number of mismatches for correct
and wrong states will be the same and correct states can not be distinguished. After
determining the internal state, the next issue will be to recover the key. This is done by
computing real feedback values from the internal state and determine the information
about the key from the feedback values by solving a system of equations.
The main weakness in Sprout round key function was that key bits are not directly
used in the NFSR update function which determines the feedback value of NFSR. Guess
capacity is not one-half for Sprout which makes Sprout as an instantination of KSGs
with Boolean KFF having guess capacity greater than one-half and the attack could be
applied to Sprout.
The designers of Sprout proposed a new algorithm Plantlet [14] having guess capacity
equal to one-half where this attack can not be applied. This new algorithm type having
guess capacity euqal to one-half is the target of our study.
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Plantlet and Fruit
In this chapter, Plantlet algorithm and Fruit algoritm are explained in detail.
4.1 Plantlet
4.1.1 Plantlet Design Goals
Planlet [14] is a lightweight 80 bit stream cipher designed for low area requirements. It
inherits the overall structure of Sprout but implements ﬁxes for discovered vulnerabilities
of Sprout. The ﬁxes done in Planlet design are:
• LFSR size is enlarged from 40 bits to 61 bits, IV size enlarged from 70 to 90 bits.
• Key selection round key function is updated. At each update a key bit is involved.
• Double-layer LFSR is introduced for high period and avoids LFSR being initialized
with the all-zero case.
4.1.2 Planlet Speciﬁcation
The Planlet structure is shown in Figure 4.1. The following notation is given below which
will be used to understand Plantlet speciﬁcation and the generic attack we applied on it.
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Figure 4.1: Plantlet Structure [14]
• t - the clock-cycle number
• Lt = (lt0, lt1, lt2, ..., lt60) - the content of the LFSR at the clock-cycle t
• N t = (nt0, nt1, nt2, ..., nt39) - the content of the NFSR at the clock-cycle t
• Ct = (ct0, ct1, ct2, ..., ct8) - counter bits at the clock-cycle t
• k = (k0, k1, k2, ..., k79) -key
• iv = (iv0, iv1, iv2, ..., iv89) - initialization vector
• kt - the round key bit used at the clock-cycle t
• zt - the keystream bit produced at the clock-cycle t
Initialization Phase
The NFSR and LFSR are ﬁlled by 90 bit IV and ones and zero. The cipher is clocked
320 times and output is fed back and also XORed with the inputs of LFSR and NFSR.
Double-Layer LFSR
Two diﬀerent phase dependent 61 bit LFSRs are used. They both use the same hardware
and almost same primitive polynomials.
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NFSR and Counter
40 bit NFSR and 9 bit counter are adopted from Sprout. NFSR update function is XOR
of non-linear combination of several NFSR bits, current key bit, output of the LFSR lt0
and a counter bit.
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The counter is a 9 bit register. The ﬁrst seven bits of the counter are used to count
cyclically from 0 to 79. The two most signiﬁcant bits is used with the ﬁrst seven bits for
320 clock cycles during initialization phase.
Round Key Function
80 bit key is used. The next key bit is selected cyclically for the NFSR update function.
kt = ktmod80, t ≥ 0
Output Function Original output function of Sprout is used. It has nonlinear parts
from both LFSR and NLFSR and linear XOR of bits from both LFSR and NFSR.
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4.1.3 Planlet Design Rationale
Round Key Function
Imbalanced key involvement in Sprout was a major weakness by looking at longer periods
where no key bit is used. In Plantlet, the key always inﬂuences the state feedback value.
Internal State Size
Having internal size equal to key size equal to key size made Sprout vulnerable to guess-
and-determine attacks. The size of LFSR is increased by 21 bits and also this allows for
a higher period of the output sequence. The designers calculated that enlarging with 15
bits is enough but 6 bits are also added to increase security margin.
Chapter 4. Plantlet and Fruit 29
Double Layer LFSR / Weakness of Initialization Phase of Sprout
In Sprout, output is fed back into LFSR and NFSR to ensure that the whole internal state
depends on all of the key and IV bits. This may cause LFSR fall into an all-zero state.
LFSR would remain in the all zero state during all encryption and causes keystream to
have a very short period. Using this weakness, a key recovery attack was mounted on
Sprout.
A countermeasure will be setting one LFSR bit to 1 after initialization but this may cause
another weakness of having the same initial state of two inputs. Two diﬀerent LFSR are
used in diﬀerent phases of the cipher. The LFSR of the initialization is extended by one
additional bit which is set to 1. For lightweight hardware implementation, almost same
polynomials are used diﬀering only in the maximum degree term.
4.2 Fruit
4.2.1 Fruit Speciﬁcation
Fruit [15] is a lightweight 80 bit stream cipher like Sprout and Planlet designed for low
area requirements. The Fruit structure is shown in Figure 4.2. The internal state consists
of 43 bit LFSR, 37 bit NFSR and two counters; one 7 bit Cr, the other 8 bit Cc counter.
The following notation is given below which will be used to understand Fruit speciﬁcation
and the generic attack we applied on it. Since the generic attack is an internal state
recovery attack, initialization speciﬁcation is ignored.
• t - the clock-cycle number
• Lt = (lt0, lt1, lt2, ..., lt42) - the content of the LFSR at the clock-cycle t
• N t = (nt0, nt1, nt2, ..., nt36) - the content of the NLFSR at the clock-cycle t
• Ctr = (ct0, ct1, ct2, ..., ct6) - the content of the Cr counter at the clock-cycle t
• Ctc = (ct7, ct8, ct9, ..., ct14) - the content of the Cc counter at the clock-cycle t
• k = (k0, k1, k2, ..., k79) -key
• kt - the round key bit generated at the clock-cycle t
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• zt - the keystream bit generated at the clock-cycle t
Figure 4.2: Fruit Structure [15]
Counter
The seven bits of the counter, Cr, is used for round key function and the last eight bits of
the counter, Cc, is used in initialization and key generation. These two counters increase
at each clock independently. Cr is shown as ct0c
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LFSR update function is deﬁned as:
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NFSR
NFSR update function is deﬁned as:
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Round Key Function
80 bit key is used. Indexes of the key bits used in NFSR update function are determined
with Cr counter and they change at each clock. Some variables are deﬁned as:
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Round key value is determined as: kt = ks.ky+32 + ku+64.kp + kq+16 + kr+48
Output Function
Output function is deﬁned as:
zt = lt6.l
t
15+ l
t
1.l
t
22+n
t
35.l
t
27+ l
t
11.l
t
33+n
t
1.n
t
33.l
t
42+n
t
0+n
t
7+n
t
13+n
t
19+n
t
24+n
t
29+n
t
36+ l
t
38
4.3 Guess Capacities of Plantlet and Fruit
Since kt is XOR'ed in the update functions of Plantlet and Fruit, the average guess
capacities of Plantlet and Fruit are one-half. Formally, the guess capacity for an internal
state is formulated in [11] as:
Prg(S) =
1
2
+
∣∣∣∣#{K : fF (K,S) = 0}2k − 12
∣∣∣∣ ,
For Plantlet,the NFSR update function or feedback value of NFSR is:
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For Fruit, the NFSR update function or feedback value of NFSR is:
nt+137 = k
t+lt0+c
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In the guess capacity formula, the function in the absolute value calculates the number
of keys where feedback value of the NFSR equals to zero. Since k bit is directly XOR'ed
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in the NFSR update functions of both Plantlet and Fruit and the other bits are same for
all possible keys for an internal state, half of the possible keys make the feedback value
zero, half of the possible key values make the feedback value one. The formula becomes:
Prg(S) =
1
2
+
∣∣∣∣2k−12k − 12
∣∣∣∣ = 12
For all internal states of Plantlet and Fruit, the guess capacity is one-half, so the average
guess capacity is one-half for Plantlet and Fruit.
Chapter 5
New and Parametric Guess and
Determine Attack
In this chapter, new guess and determine attack and parametric guess and determine
attack mounted on Plantlet and Fruit algorithms and improving new guess and determine
attack through trade-oﬀ mounted on Plantlet algorithm are explained in detail.
5.0.1 New Guess and Determine Attack Mounted On Plantlet
The Plantlet round key function is an improved version of Sprout. It cyclically selects
the next key bit for the NFSR update function. It is impossible to use guess capacity as
a distinguisher for Kara and Esgin attack [11] but this design, involving key bit cyclically
in the NFSR update function created a new weakness. The same key bit is used at clocks
t and t + keysize for an internal state and this is used for both internal state recovery
and key bit recovery at the same time.
We improved and changed Kara and Esgin algorithm [11] for our attack. The internal
state candidates are not eliminated for their mismatch counts. Since all of them would
have approximately same mismatch counts because of having same guess capacity, one-
half. Number of iterations is a little above key size, 90 for Plantlet. The feedback value
is either determined from the output stream or guessed. Since the key bit is directly
XOR'ed in the NFSR update funtion, we calculated the key value at each clock from
feedback value and internal state values and saved the key value at each clock. After
33
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80 clocks, we begin also comparing key value of the internal state candidate at clock t
and the key value we saved at (t − 80). For the correct state, they would be same at
the corresponding clocks but for an incorrect internal state candidate, they would be
randomly equal and after a few clocks, the state will be eliminated since key values will
not match. The correct state will exist until the end of clocks (iteration) and at the same
time key bits are also determined.
Determination of feedback value from output stream is given below:
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This implies for a internal state candidate at clock t when nt6 and l
t
34 are equal to 1,
feedback value of NFSR can be calculated from zt+2, LFSR and NFSR tap values.
Determination of key value at clock t is given below:
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We just replaced key and feedback values and get the key value at clock t.
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The generic attack algorithm named as "New Guess and Determine Attack" steps can
be summarized as follows:
• Input: Output stream bits, internal state candidates,
• Output: The key bits and the correct internal state which generated the given
output stream bits,
• Attack Phase
 For each internal state candidate execute the following steps:
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1. Determine or guess the feedback value of the NFSR from output stream
bit, NFSR and LFSR bits at each clock.
2. Determine the key value from the feedback value of NFSR, the other
NFSR and LFSR bits.
3. Eliminate internal state if guessed feedback value is incorrect in the next
clock.
4. Check key bits which should be equal after key bits start repeating. (e.g.
kt == kt−80 for Plantlet)
5. Eliminate internal state candidate if key bits are not equal.
 The correct internal state which generated the output stream will be left at
the end of iterations. Key bits are automatically determined during iterations
for the correct internal state.
This algorithm can be used for any KSGs with Boolean KFF where key size and internal
state size are equal but it is not eﬀective for Plantlet since Plantlet internal state size
is 101 bits. (61 bits from LFSR and 40 bits from NFSR) For this attack, the attacker
should use 2101 internal state candidates to recover the correct internal state and key
bits which is much higher than 280 key candidates of exhaustive key search. In order to
decrease the complexity of the attack, two novel ideas/extensions are implemented and
combined with the "New Guess and Determine Attack":
• Parametric Guess and Determine Attack
• Improving New Guess and Determine Attack Through Trade-Oﬀ
5.0.2 Parametric Guess and Determine Attack Mounted On Plantlet
Before applying the ﬁrst idea on the attack, two improvements are done to simplify
the attack for Plantlet. In the ﬁrst step, cipher was run in backward direction and the
keystream generation and feedback functions are formulated in backward direction as
in [9]. This improvement is done since in the output function of the cipher, nt1 alone
is XORed with other taps. In backward direction, nt+10 will be the feedback value and
nt1 will be the feedback value after two clocks which can be determined from output
stream value zt+2 and the output function. In the previous attack, the feedback value
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was either determined or guessed, but in our new attack, the feedback values can be
always determined from the output stream. The derivations are shown below:
LFSR update in forward direction:
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NFSR update in forward direction:
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NFSR update in backward direction:
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Output function does not change:
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In the second step, we simulated Plantlet running in backward direction as if it runs in
forward direction.
LFSR update function:
lt+160 = l
t
0 + l
t
7 + l
t
18 + l
t
27 + l
t
41 + l
t
47,
lt+1i = li+1t
NFSR update function:
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Output function:
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Derivation of the determination of the feedback value from output function is given
below:
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As it can be seen above, feedback value of the NFSR can always be determined from the
output stream. This simpliﬁed our attack, since we didn't have to guess and check the
feedback value of NFSR. Using output stream values, the feedback values of NFSR are
directly determined at each clock.
The ﬁrst new idea in order to decrease the complexity of the attack was replacing some
taps/elements of the LFSR with variables during the attack. We randomly deﬁned some
taps of the LFSR as variables and implemented the attack algorithm using the internal
state candidates with LFSR having variables in some taps instead of values. The key
bits determined would be nonlinear equations of the variables. A new stage is added
to attack algorithm as solving equations for the variables and the correct internal state
would have the unique solution for the variables. After determining variable values, key
bits are also determined using them.
The generic attack algorithm named as "Parametric Guess and Determine Attack" steps
can be summarized as follows:
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• Input: Output stream bits, internal state candidates,
• Output: The key bits and the correct internal state which generated the given
output stream bits,
• Initialization Phase:
 Check if the NFSR feedback value can be determined from output stream in
forward or backward direction. If the NFSR feedback value can be determined
from output stream, formulate feedback functions in backward direction.
 Replace a ﬁxed number of random bits of LFSR with variables.
• Attack Phase
 For each internal state candidate execute the following steps:
1. Determine the feedback value of the NFSR from output stream bit, NFSR
and LFSR bits as a nonlinear function of variables of LFSR at each clock.
2. Determine the key value from the feedback value of NFSR, the other
NFSR and LFSR bits as a nonlinear function of variables of LFSR at
each clock.
3. Generate equations for the keys which should be equal after key bits start
repeating. (e.g. kt == kt+80 for Plantlet)
4. Solve the nonlinear equations generated in the previous step.
5. Eliminate internal state candidate if there is no solution.
 The correct internal state which generated the output stream will be left with
a unique solution for the variables.
 Calculate the key bits using the unique solution of the variables.
As a proof of concept, we implemented algorithm using six variables and recovered the
correct internal state bits and key bits successfully. Six random taps of the LFSR are
chosen as variables x, y, z, w, k, u. The LFSR update function is simple XOR of LFSR
bits but the NFSR update function has both XOR and multiplication of NFSR bits.
Because of the multiplication eﬀect, the bits and the feedback values of the NFSR and
the key values determined from the feedback values are calculated as nonlinear equations
of x, y, z, w, u, k variables consisting both XOR and multiplication operations. Since
there are six variables, nonlinear equations have 26 = 64 combination of x, y, z, w, k,
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u. The number of variables is chosen as six to write the code for multiplication of two
bits of the NFSR having both 64 combinations of x, y, z, w, u, k easily, e.g. if we
chosed the number of the variables as seven, multiplication code should be written for
multiplying two taps both having 128 diﬀerent combinations of the variables. At the
end of the implementation of the algorithm, we have nonlinear equations of the variables
representing key values kt, t = 0, 1, 2, ...90 where kt = kt−80 which should be equal to
each other for the correct internal state candidate.
In the second stage, an exhaustive search is done to recover the variables; x, y, z, w,
k, u. There are 26 = 64 diﬀerent candidates for them. The equations are solved for a
unique solution using 6.2 equations on average. A candidate is either eliminated or a
unique solution is left. For the correct internal state candidate, the unique x, y, z, w, k,
u solution satisﬁes all equations and key is also recovered by solving the equations for k0
to k80.
In the previous attack, the attacker should use 2101 internal state candidates for Plantlet
but this improvement decreased internal state candidate number to 295. Same attack
algorithm is used but comparison of the key values diﬀered. Key values are nonlinear
equations of variables where kt should be equal to kt−80 . At the end of iterations, the
correct internal state and the key values are recovered since wrong internal candidates are
eliminated during solving equations for variables or checking whether the next equation
is satisﬁed for the left unique solution of variables. The time for multiplying the NFSR
bits as nonlinear equations and solving the nonlinear equations should be added to attack
complexity.
The elapsed times for both attacks are compared for 1000 internal state candidates.
Both new guess and determine attack and parametric guess and determine attack with
6 variables are executed on a standard PC. The time elapsed during new guess and
determine attack is 0.12 seconds and the time elapsed during parametric guess and
determine attack is 6.6 seconds. The new guess and determine attack is about 55 times
faster than the parametric guess and determine attack, but this is normal since each bit is
represented by 64 bits and multiplication of two bits transformed into the multiplication
of two 64 bits. This test coding is done as a proof of concept not for performance but it
is still faster than new guess and determine attack using 2101 candidates.
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For Plantlet, the attacker should use the attack algorithm with 22 variables to be faster
than exhaustive key search but implementation of using 22 variables would not be similar
to using 6 variables. We have two problems to solve:
1. Generating nonlinear equations for 222 combinations of variables and multiplication
of two nonlinear equations having 222 combinations of variables.
2. Solving nonlinear equations having 222 combinations of 22 variables.
These two items can not be done online during attack since it would decrease the attack
speed exponentially. For the ﬁrst item, the multiplication of two nonlinear equations
having 222 combinations of variables can be implemented as multiplication of two poly-
nomials and can be precomputed oine and saved in a table. During the attack, when
two NFSR bits are multiplied, the result will be read directly from this table. The
memory access should be done for each multiplication of NFSR bits. For the second
item, solving nonlinear equations having 222 combinations of 22 variables can also be
precomputed oine saved in group of tables as (222, 23) solutions. Since the nonlinear
equations will be solved on average 23 equations but this will need a huge memory. When
the nonlinear equations for key equalities are created at the end of the attack algorithm,
the solutions should be searched from these tables.
The memory needed for the attack for p variables can be formulated as 22p for multipli-
cation table and
(
2p
p+1
)
for solving the nonlinear equations. The attack complexity would
be 2n−p if the generation and solving the nonlinear equations would be done by table
lookups and the memory needed for the attack would be 22p +
(
2p
p+1
)
. Multiplication
table would be accesed for each multiplication of two NFSR bits.
5.0.3 Improving New Guess and Determine Attack Through Trade-Oﬀ
The second idea to decrease the complexity of the attack was to use our new guess and
determine attack with trade-oﬀ . We made an extension for the new guess and determine
attack for Plantlet like ciphers where the key bit is directly and cylically XOR'ed in the
internal state update function and key cycle period is equal to key bit size and we
combined our attack with TMDTO attacks.
The extension attack steps applied for Plantlet are :
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• The attacker has a generated 80 bit output stream, z1.
• Make a guess for the internal state which generated this output stream, z1.
• Using this internal state candidate and output stream, run our new guess and
determine attack and determine 80-bit key bits.
• Using the determined key bits and internal state candidate, generate the 101 bit
output stream, z2, following the z1 sequence.
• For a constant z1, for each guess of the internal state, we determine a unique 101
bit z2.
• For a constant z1, this can be called as a one way function between internal state
candidate and output stream z2. If we have internal state candidate, we can de-
termine the following output stream z2 for a constant z1, but if we have z2, we can
not determine internal state value for a constant z1.
• Using Hellman [33] tables, the formula T.M2 = N2 and our new guess and deter-
mine attack, for a constant z1, to recover the internal state and key bits, instead of
making exhaustive search for internal state candidates as 2101 trials, with T = 280
complexity, we need a memory M as 261 to determine the internal state value which
generated this output stream. Data complexity would be 280 for this case.
• Data complexity can be reduced by increasing memory in Hellman tables. In the
previous item, we have a constant z1 and we prepare Hellman tables for z1 and
search z1 in the given data. If we use another 80 bit output stream as input, we
can decrease data complexity. Since we would prepare Hellman tables for each of
output stream sequence as 2.261. Memory complexity, M, would be 262 where data
complexity, D, would decrease to 279 to search for the target output stream. There
is a trade-oﬀ between memory M and data D where M.D is ﬁxed.
Using the trade-oﬀ attack with our new guess and determine attack, we developed a
theorem for Plantlet like ciphers as:
Theorem: For Plantlet like ciphers where the key bit is directly and cylically XOR'ed in
the internal state update function and key cycle period is equal to the key size, internal
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state recovery can be done using new guess and determine attack with trade-oﬀ attack
with a formula as:
T (DM)2 = (NK)2
where T: Time Complexity, D: Data Complexity, N: Internal State Size Complexity, K :
Key Complexity
Sketch: Assume attacker has k bit output stream. Using this k bit output stream, for
n bit internal state, he generates the following n bit output stream.
This can be deﬁned as a one-way function between n bit internal state to n bit output
stream.
Using Hellman tables for this function, the time and memory complexity would be:
T.M2 = N2 and for this ciphers D = K since length of the input data to be searched
should be equal to size of the key to determine key bits.
If we multiply both side of the equation with M : D.M = K.N/
√
T which implies when
T is ﬁxed D.M is ﬁxed.
We generalize the equation as:
T (DM)2 = (NK)2
Corollary1:
For Planlet like ciphers, for the cipher to be resistant to TMDTO attacks, the internal
state size complexity should be as N ≥ K3/2 so for Plantlet, the internal state size be
120 bits in order to resist TMDTO attacks.
Proof : When T = D = M = K, using the above formula K5 = K2.N2 → N = K3/2
For Plantlet, internal state size complexity should be 2(80∗3/2) = 2120 bits in order to
resist TMDTO attacks.
Corollary2:
The attack complexity reduced to 272.4 for Plantlet by using the trade-oﬀ attack with
our new guess and determine attack.
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Proof : For Plantlet N = 2101 and K = 280, using the above formula: T (DM)2 = 2362
for the best trade-oﬀ when T = D = M , T = D = M = 272.4
5.0.4 New and Parametric Guess and Determine Attacks Mounted On
Fruit
Since kt is directly involved and XOR'ed with the other elements in the Fruit NFSR
update function, guess capacity is one-half and our generic attack can be applied to
Fruit algorithm. The same key bit is used at clocks t and t + 128 for an internal state.
The key period is diﬀerent from Plantlet because of the round key function of Fruit. The
key bits start repeating at Cr counter roll over as 27 = 128.
Since nt36 is directy XOR'ed in the output function alone, feedback value of NFSR can be
determined directly from output stream. Determination of feedback value from output
stream is given below:
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As it can be seen above, feedback value of the NFSR can always be determined from the
output stream, zt+2, LFSR and NFSR tap values.
Determination of key value at clock t is given below:
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Just replace key and feedback value and get the key value at clock t.
kt = nt+137 +l
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Since Fruit algorithm key size and internal state size are equal, to test our attack, in the
ﬁrst step, we didn't use any variables and applied the new guess and determine attack
whose details are given in the previous chapter directly to the cipher. In the second step,
we mounted the parametric guess and determine attack. The counter Cr value is set to
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zero at the beginning of the attacks. For each internal state candidate, we determined
key bits for 128 clocks and after clock 128, key bits are determined but we also started
comparing key values. If key values are not equal (kt = kt−128 ), internal state candidate
is eliminated and correct internal state candidate having key values equal is left after a
few clock cycles and key value included in the NFSR update function is also determined
at the same time with internal state bits.
Round key function of Fruit enables nonlinear combination of key bits at each round.
Since resulting key bit involved in NFSR update function is determined, in order to
determine real key bits, solving nonlinear equations will be needed at the end of the
attack.
In Fruit, Cr counter starting value is determined at the end of initialization phase of the
cipher and it is based on the key, NFSR and LFSR bits, so an attacker would not know
the Cr counter starting value to mount the attack. This issue can be easily solved since
counter bit ct3 is directly involved in NFSR update function. Even the Cr counter starting
value is not correct, during comparison of key values at t and t−128, ct3 and ct−1283 values
are equal which will not aﬀect equality. Correct feedback values are determined from
output stream and our generic attack recovers the correct internal state using the key
comparisons but key bits recovered depend on the Cr counter starting value. At the end
of our attack, 128 bit values of (kt + ct3) are recovered.
To recover the correct key bits of the Fruit algorithm:
• Mount improved or parametric guess and determine attack.
• Recover the correct internal state and key bits involved in the NFSR update func-
tion depending on Cr counter value. (kt + ct3)
• Solve nonlinear equations for 128 key bits and get candidate key bits for each
counter value.
• Apply exhaustive search for 128 candidate key bits to recover the real key bits.
The attack complexity without using any variables is 280 and this is faster than exhaustive
search since initialization phase is not included in the attack which should be included
in the exhaustive search. The attack complexity can be reduced to 274 when we have
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applied parametric guess and determine attack using six variables since instead of using
280 internal state candidates for the attack, we used 280−6 internal state candidates.
Solving equations for six variables are done during attack as a proof of concept for our
attack implementation but multiplication of the NFSR bits and solutions of the nonlinear
equations for six variables must be done oine and saved in tables as explained in Plantlet
section to achieve 274 complexity.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, the security analysis of stream ciphers having keystream generator with
keyed update function is studied and a generic internal state and key recovery attack is
introduced for keystream generators with keyed update function having guess capacity
one-half for the ﬁrst time. This generic attack is mounted on Plantlet and Fruit algo-
rithms and internal state and key bits are recovered successfully for both of the ciphers.
Involving key bits directly and cyclically in the update function of a keystream generator
leads to a weakness for recovering key bits where key bits can be determined from the
feedback values at the correponding clocks. Since it is an internal state recovery attack,
the initialization phase is not considered and implemented during attack which should
be taken into consideration for the exhaustive key search attack. When the internal
state size is greater than key size like in Plantlet, the exhaustive key search is faster than
this attack so the complexity of the attack is reduced by two novel ideas and two new
extensions are added on the new generic attack.
The ﬁrst idea to decrease the complexity of the attack is using variables and solving
nonlinear equations during key recovery. As a proof of concept, the number of variables
is chosen as six and the attack is successfully mounted on Plantlet and Fruit algorithms
and internal state bits and key bits are recovered. Increasing number of variables will
reduce attack complexity, but it would not be easy to generate and multiplicate the
nonlinear combinations of the variables and to ﬁnd the solution of the generated non-
linear equations. Precomputation and memory would be needed for both generation and
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multiplication of nonlinear combinations of these variables and for ﬁnding the solution
of the generated nonlinear equations.
The second idea to decrease the complexity of the attack is combining the attack with
trade-oﬀ attack. Using Hellman tables with the new generic guess and determine attack,
instead of searching all 2internalstatesize, the attack complexity can be reduced to 280 time
complexity, T, 261 memory complexity, M, and 280 data complexity, D where the data
complexity can be decreased by increasing the memory complexity since M.D is ﬁxed.
This would be the trade-oﬀ for the attacker.
Using this trade-oﬀ, for Plantlet like ciphers where the key bit is directly and cylically
XOR'ed in the internal state update function and key cycle period is equal to the key size,
a generalization is made as T (DM)2 = (NK)2. By using this formula, two corollaries
are achieved. The ﬁrst one is that for Plantlet like ciphers, the internal state size must
be at least keysize ∗ (3/2) to be resistant to TMDTO attacks. The second one is that
using our new guess and determine attack with trade-oﬀ attack, the attack complexity
for Planlet is reduced to 272.4.
Bibliography
[1] S. Banik, A. Bogdanov, T. Isobe, K. Shibutani, H. Hiwatari, T. Akishita, and
F. Regazzoni. Midori: A block cipher for low energy. ASIACRYPT. Springer, pages
411436, 2014.
[2] C. D. Canni`ere, O. Dunkelman, and M. Knezevic. Katan and ktantan a family of
small and eﬃcient hardware-oriented block ciphers. CHES 2009, ser. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 5747:272288, 2009.
[3] A. Bogdanova, L. R. Knudsen, G. Leander, C. Paar, A. Poschmanna, M. J. B.
Robshaw, Y. Seurin, and C. Vikkelsoe. Present: An ultra-lightweight block cipher.
CHES 2007, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
4727:450466, 2007.
[4] J. Guo, T. Peyrin, A. Poschmann, and M. J. B. Robshaw. The led block cipher.
CHES 2011, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6917:326341, 2011.
[5] R. Beaulieu, D. Shors, J. Smith, S. Treatman-Clark, B. Weeks, and L.Wingers.
The simon and speck families of lightweight block ciphers. IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive, page 404, 2013.
[6] G. Yang, B. Zhu, V. Suder, M. D. Aagaard, and G. Gong. The simeck family
of lightweight block ciphers. CHES 2015, ser.Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 307329, 2015.
[7] K. Shibutani, T. Isobe, H. Hiwatari, A. Mitsuda, T. Akishita, and T. Shirai. Pic-
colo: An ultra-lightweight blockcipher. CHES 2011, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer, 6917:342357, 2011.
[8] V. M. Frederik Armknecht. On lightweight stream ciphers with shorter internal
states. FSE - 22nd International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, 2015.
48
Bibliography 49
[9] O. Kara and M. F. Esgin. Practical cryptanalysis of full sprout with tmd tradeoﬀ
attacks. SAC, pages 6785, 2015.
[10] V. Lallemand and M. N. Plasencia. Cryptanalysis of full sprout. Advances in
Cryptology CRYPTO 2015, pages 663682, 2015.
[11] O. Kara and M. F. Esgin. On analysis of lightweight stream ciphers with keyed
update. IEEE Transactions on Computers PP(99), 2018.
[12] B. Zhang and X. Gong. Another tradeoﬀ attack on sprout-likestream ciphers. Ad-
vances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2015, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
9453:561585, 2015.
[13] S. Maitra, S. Sarkar, A. Baksi, and P. Dey. Key recovery from state information of
sprout: Application to cryptanalysis and fault attack. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2015/236, 2015.
[14] V. Mikhalev, F. Armknecht, and C. Mueller. On ciphers that continuously access the
non-volatile key. FSE - 24th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption,
2017.
[15] V. A. Ghafari, H. Hu, and Y. Chen. Fruit-v2: Ultra-lightweight stream cipher with
shorter internal state. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2016, 2016.
[16] S. Dey and S. Sarkar. Cryptanalysis of full round fruit. IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive 2017, 2017.
[17] https://medium.com/asecuritysite-when-bob-met-alice/
light-weight-cryptography-trivium-aa986f0b881, 2018.
[18] https://www.researchgate.net/figure/General-structure-of-a_
synchronous-stream-cipher-encryption-and-decryption_fig1_267858656,
2010.
[19] https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Self-Synchronizing-Stream-Cipher_
Scheme_fig7_326209454, 2018.
[20] https://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/spring19/cos126/
assignments/lfsr/, 2019.
[21] https://tr.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dosya:A5-1.png, 2019.
Bibliography 50
[22] T. Siegenthaler. Decrypting a class of stream ciphers using ciphertext only. Com-
puters, IEEE Transactions, 1985.
[23] A. Biryukov and A. Shamir. Cryptanalytic time/memory/data tradeoﬀs for stream
ciphers. Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT 2000, 2000.
[24] D. Coppersmith, S. Halevi, and C. Jutla. Cryptanalysis of stream ciphers with linear
masking. Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 2002, 2002.
[25] A. Joux and F. Muller. A chosen iv attack against turing. Selected Areas in Cryp-
tography, volume 3006 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2004.
[26] J. J. Hoch and A. Shamir. Fault analysis of stream ciphers. Chryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems CHES 2004, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2004.
[27] http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream. estream: Ecrypt stream cipher project, ist-2002-
507932. ECRYPT, 2002.
[28] M. Hell, T. Johansson, and W. Meier. Grain - a stream cipher for constrained
environments. International Journal of Wireless and Mobile Computing 2(1), pages
8693, 2007.
[29] M. Hell, T. Johansson, A. Maximov, and W. Meier. A stream cipher proposal:
Grain-128. EEE International Symposium on Information Theory, 2006.
[30] M. Agren, M. Hell, T. Johansson, andW. Meier. Grain-128a: A new version of grain-
128 with optional authentication. International Journal of Wireless and Mobile
Computing 5(1), pages 4859, 2011.
[31] https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Key-and-IV-length-in-Grain-Family_
ofCiphers_tbl1_307643189, 2014.
[32] https://www.cryptolux.org/mediawiki-esc2015/images/d/d0/Small-ESC_
Armknecht.pdf, 2015.
[33] M. E. Hellman. A cryptanalytic time-memory trade-oﬀ. IEEE Transactions On
Information Theory, Vol. IT-26, NO. 4, 1980.
